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NOTES
Denial of Coverage for "Experimental"
Medical Procedures: The Problem of

De Novo Review Under ERISA
INTRODUCTION

The recent proliferation and diversity of medical interventions
have led health care consumers, providers, and third party payors
to disagree regarding the effectiveness of specific procedures in the
management of injury and disease.' While consumers seek access
to their treatments of choice, physicians attempt to balance research
findings concerning innovative approaches with more generally accepted standards of care, and payors try to avoid increased expense
2
for unproven therapies.
In pnnciple, the decision to attempt a novel course of treatment
should be the subject of discussion and informed consent between
the physician and the patient. 3 New medical technology, however,

I Apart from the widely discussed problems of health care cost containment, the
effort to assess the value of various treatments is related to the interest among governmental
and pnvate payors in ways to measure and compare the outcomes'of medical treatments in
order to make both efficient and effective use of finite resources. See Ellwood, Shattuck
Lecture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience, 318 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1549 (1988) (an overview of the topic of outcome assessment); Morreim, Cost
Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1719 (1987) (analysis
of the interaction between cost constraints and medicolegal concerns); Morreim, Stratified
Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CAM 356 (1989)
(recommendations for judicial evaluation of the standard of medical care).
2 See Eddy, ComparingBenefits and Harms: The Balance Sheet, 263 J. A.M.A. 2493
(1990) (review of quantitative and qualitative assessment methodologies); Roper, Winkenwerder, Hackbarth & Krakauer, Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and
Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197 (1988) (discussion of the federal
government's agenda for outcome assessment).
3 See, e.g., Abrams, Patient Advocate or Secret Agent?, 256 J. A.M.A. 1784 (1986)
(potential adverse effects of payor constraints on role of physician as patient's advocate);
Agich, Rationing and Professional Autonomy, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 77 (1990)
(complex interaction between physician decision making and third party requirements);
Gaylin, Sadier & Sadier, Autonomy-Paternalism-Community-A 15th Anmversary Sympo-
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is rarely unambiguous in its demonstrated efficacy and tends to be
4
more expensive than established methods.
Contracts for payment of health care expenses normally limit
the type or amount of coverage available. 5 Such limitations are
influenced by both market pressures and state and federal statutes
that require health insurance carriers to adhere to mimmum standards of equitable dealing with insured parties. 6 These statutes
generally govern adnimstrative procedures7 deferring to the expertise of payors' medical panels and treating physicians in the
choice of intervention. Since 1987, however, suits regarding demal
of benefits under employer-sponsored health insurance plans have
frequently come under federal jurisdiction," because of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 9
Insurance coverage for some medical interventions may be demed because their efficacy is not proven.' 0 The 1989 establishment
of a de novo standard of review for demal of health plan benefits
under ERISA"I has placed federal district court judges in the position of ruling on the validity of such treatments. This raises
difficult questions regarding the appropriateness of the adversarial
2
process as a forum for climcal decision making.'

sium, 14 HAsTiNcs CENTER REP 5 (1984) (comprehensive survey of changes in the role of
the physician); Siegler, The Progressionof Medicine: From Physician Paternalismto Patient
Autonomy to Bureaucratic Parsimony, 145 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 713 (1985) (influence of
payors on physician-patient relationships).
4 Ginzberg, High-Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs, 263 J. A.M.A. 1820,
1820 (1990) (contribution of new technology to cost increases).
See generally Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions Under Hospital or Medical
Services (Blue Cross-Blue Shield) Contracts, 81 A.L.R. 2d 927, 931-33 (1962).
The complex relationship between state regulatory statutes and preemption by the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter ERISA], is discussed
by the Supreme Court in three cases that place increasing emphasis on preemption: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); see
also Engel, ERISA: To Preempt or Not to Preempt, That is a Question!, 22 TORT & INS.
L. J. 431 (1987) (pre-PilotLife discussion of. preemption clause interpretation); Nelson,
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux: The Supreme Court's Federalization of Employee
Benefit Law, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 507 (1988) (case analysis and implications).
I See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-50 (1987) (discussing
Mississippi statutes governing administrative procedures).
a Id. at 41.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
1oSee infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
" See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) [hereinafter
Firestone II] (establishing de novo standard). For applications of this standard, see McGee
v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan., Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
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The following analysis presents the framework for ERISA preemption of claims appealing a denial of insurance benefits 13 and
the recent trend away from deferential treatment of admnistrative
decisions regarding experimental procedures. 14 While courts have
generally reached the same conclusions under de novo review as
under the previous standard, 15 the troubling implications of this
trend suggest the need for a structure that allows more objective
6
data collection and judicial deterlmnation.'
I.

ERISA

REGULATION OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED GROUP HEALTH

PLANS

The origins of ERISA 17 may be traced to Congressional dissatisfaction with the ability of its statutory predecessors, most notably
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958,18 to curb
abuses by plan fiduciaries.' 9 The definition of an ERISA fiduciary
hinges on the discretion vested in an individual or entity to control
plan management, administration, or investments. 2° The fiduciary
is thus distinguished from one with merely mimsterial duties, who
lacks discretion regarding benefit denial. Although the duties and
standards of care for these fiduciaries derive from the common
law of trusts, 21 exculpatory clauses and other sluelds commonly
found in the language of trusts are not available to them.2 Conlibrary, Dist. file); Rollo v. Blue Cross-Blue Slueld, No. 90-597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Slueld, 741 F Supp. 586
(E.D. Vir. 1990); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989);
Stnngfield v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
12 Zweig and Perry, Health Care Goes to Court, Judges Need Access to Impartial
Medical Expertise, Wash. Post, July 17, 1990, § Health, at 5; see also infra notes 156-65
and accompanying text.
," See infra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 92-155 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
,S 29 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1958), repealed by ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1988).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Arm,. Naws 4639, 4642.
20The relevant portions of the statute, ERISA § 3(21)(A), for employee welfare plans
reads as follows:
[a] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
disposition of its assets
discretionary responsibility in the admimstration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
21 ERISA § 404 (a)(1) provides for a "prudent man" standard of care and reqmres a
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gress explicitly directed that ERISA reform and preempt weaker
state and federal statutes, which had led to "abuses and unsound
practices which jeopardize[d] the security of assets and threaten[ed]
the availability of funds for employees." 23
Like much of ERISA, this language is more applicable to
employee retirement plans than to welfare plans such as those
providing health benefits. The admnistration of retirement plans
is largely a question of prudent investment, while for welfare plans,
such elements as disclosure of the terms of the plan, adherence to
these terms, and fiduciary conflict of interest are often in controversy. The elaboration of guidelines for adnuistration of ERISA
employee welfare plans has been left to the evolutionary process
of case law
A.

The Evolution of Preemption

Because mnety percent of all full-time employees in medium
and large companies participate in employer-sponsored health insurance,24 any change in health plan regulation has widespread
effects. ERISA includes three provisions that have led to its preemptive regulation of group health plans:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.25
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing m this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any
law of any state which regulates insurance, banking or securities.76
Neither an employee benefit plan described m § 1003(a) of this
title, which is not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title (other than
a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death
benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer
or to
be engaged in the business of insurance
for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
fiduciary to act "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable expenses of admmstering the plan[.]" 29 U.S.C. §

i104 (1988).
- ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988) explicitly overrides such provisions.
LEOisLATIrvE HIsTORY OF THE EmpLOYEE RETIREmENT INCOME SECURIT AcT oF 1974,
1 SUBcoMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COuM. ON LABOR AND PULC WLFARE, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 204 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
2 Levit, Freeland & Waldo, National Health Care Spending Trends: 1988, HAiTH
AsAIMs, Summer 1990 at 177.
- ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (preemption clause).
- ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1988) (saving clause).
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insurance contracts, banks, trust compames, or investment compames. 27

Thus, health insurance acquired as a benefit of employment,
as distinguished from insurance purchased directly from a carner,
is generally subject to federal, rather than state, regulation.2 After
several years of divergent rulings among the circuits, broad federal

preemption was upheld by the Supreme Court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v Dedeaux.29 Pilot Life disallowed state law tort claims,
such as those for bad faith demal of insurance coverage, when
insurance was provided through a self-funded, employer-sponsored
31
plan. 30 The scope of preemption remains less than comprehensive,

but exceptions are rapidly dinumshing. For example, federally preempted plans are shielded from the indirect regulation by which
32
states govern independent providers of technical services.

- ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § i144(b)(2)(B) (1988) (deemer clause). The
difficulty in interpreting this and the preceding "saving" clause arises because statutes are
variously construed as to their regulation of insurance. Generally, the three-factor test
established m the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988), has been applied,
following Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985) ("[F]irst,
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.").
2s At this time, only Montana and West Virginia recognize private actions under
unfair insurance practice statutes. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d
58, 63 (finding federal jurisdiction and discussing exceptions); contra McDonough v. Blue
Cross, 131 F.R.D. 467, 468 (April 25, 1990 W.D. Pa.) (Where "ERISA's exclusive enforcement provisions do not vindicate the same interests that the plaintiff's state law claims seek
to vindicate," specifically m the area of compensatory relief, state court jurisdiction may
be found.).
- 481 U.S. 41 (1987). For a detailed discussion of Pilot Life, see Nelson, supra note
6.
'o Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
11See Self-Insurance Inst. v. Gallagher, 909 F.2d 1491 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (unpublished)
(preserving distinction between self-funded and fully insured plans). "Self-funded" plans
customarily involve two layers of admimstration: the quotidian decisions of the employersponsor, and admimstrative guidance in more arcane areas, such as provider credentialing,
utilization review, case management, and quality assurance, from a large and diverse
insurance provider. The majority of courts previously had refused to consider limitations
on employer risk as jeopardizing self-funded status. However, Firestone If has had the
effect of abolishing what was often a very slight distinction between fully insured and selffunded plans for regulatory purposes. For a decision subjecting assertions of self-funding
to closer examination when stop-loss provisions allowed limitation of employer risk, see
Hall v. Pennwalt Group Comprehensive Medical Expense Benefits Plan, No. 88-7672 (March
29, 1989 E.D. Pa.) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). Other plans not covered by ERISA
are those made available to government employees, including school districts, plans required
by statute, such as those for workers' compensation, unemployment, and disability coverage,
and certain church plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988).
32 Advantages thus gained by ERISA regulation include avoidance of expensive and
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Group health plans subject to ERISA regulation may limit
coverage of medical interventions on a variety of grounds,33 but
challenges to the interpretation of specific exclusions are authorized
under ERISA.14 Conversely, the validity of exclusionary language
itself may come under state court jurisdiction when state mandates
fall within the traditional purview of state authority, affect relations among the major ERISA participants, or have a relatively
minor impact on the plan as a whole. 35 Concerns have been raised
regarding the apparent restraints placed by ERISA preemption on
consumer protection available to health insurance purchasers in the
state courts.3 6 The plaintiff under ERISA not only must bring suit
in federal court, but loses the right to a jury trial,3 7 pumtive
damages, 38 and compensation for mental distress. 39 Monetary com-

burdensome state regulations, greater control over cash outlays, and exemption from state
taxation of insurance prermums, including those used to fund high-risk pools.
33 See supra note 5; for examples of exclusions, see infra note 53.
-1 Under the civil enforcement provisions, ERISA § 502(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1988), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to
enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Relief
may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to
benefits, or an injunction against a plan admimstrator's improper refusal to pay benefits.
Such relief also may be sought against a plan fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988).
35 The courts continue to diverge regarding the relationship between ERISA and statemandated provider laws. Compare Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Frappier, 698 S.W.2d
326 (Mo. 1985) (state law not preempted) with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Comm., 441 A.2d 1098 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), rev'd, 463 A.2d 793 (Md. 1983) (ERISA
preempts). These laws, as opposed to common-law principles, are frequently given force on
the grounds that they "regulate insurance," a deterrmnative criterion under the McCarranFerguson Act principles. See supra note 27; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987).
- 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(i)(B) (1988) places general restrictions on consequential damages. See DiPaola, Wrongful Dental of Health Insurance Benefits: Litigating the ERISA
Preemption Defense, FiA. BAR J. April 1990, at 64; Strand & Mickelsen, Will ERISA
Continue to Screen Self-Funded Plansfrom Regulators' Glare?, Healthweek, July 20, 1990,
at 35. At least one court has found these restrictions inconsistent with the "central policy
goal of ERISA [, which] is to protect the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans." McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F Supp. 1314, 1315-16
(N.D. Ala. 1988), citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). Another recent
decision used a procedural loophole to prevent removal, finding that ERISA preemption as
a defense "does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and therefore, does
not authorize removal to a federal court." McDonough, 131 F.R.D. 467, 468 (W.D. Pa.
April 25, 1990), citing Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). This case is
distinguished because benefits were not sought for plaintiff's decedent; compensatory and
wrongful death damages represented interests that would not be vindicated by an ERISA
action in federal district court.
3 See, e.g., Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
- Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985), quoting
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981); see also Harris v.
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pensation is limited generally to recovery of plan benefits, although
equitable relief may be granted at the court's discretion. 40 In speallowed attorney fees
cific circumstances, for example, courts have
41
and costs for victorious ERISA plaintiffs.
B.

Exclusion of Benefits

Health insurance policies commonly exclude benefits for medical procedures found to be "experimental" or "investigational"
in nature.4 2 In medical usage, a procedure is thus designated when
"there is no consensus on the (a) safety or (b) effectiveness of this
technolqgy to date, there is insufficient evidence to determine its
appropriateness, or it warrants further study; use of this technology
population should
for the given indication in the specified patient
'43
protocols.
research
be confined largely to
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 729 F Supp. 49 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (demal of punitive damages
in health benefit context).
11See, e.g., Russell, 473 U.S. 134; Johnson v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng. Beneficial Ass'n.,
857 F.2d 514, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534-38 (9th Cir.
1986); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Rollo v. Maxicare of Louisiana, 698 F Supp. III (E.D. La.
1988).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
4,See, e.g., McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar.
27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File); Rollo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 90597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
42See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480 (9th
Cir. 1990); Exbom v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health & Welfare
Fund, 900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990) (gastroplasty); Johnson, 857 F.2d 514 (liver transplant);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (in vitro fertilization);
McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS) ("coma arousal" therapy); Washington v. Winn-Dixie of
La., 736 F Supp. 1418 (E.D. La. 1990) (hyperbanc oxygen for quadriplegia); Rollo, No.
90-597 (LEXIS) (HDCT-ABMT); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 741 F Supp. 586
(E.D. Va. 1990) (HDCT-ABMT); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131
(D.N.J. 1989) (ABMT); Stringfield v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69
(E.D. Tenn 1989) (radial keratotomy); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F Supp. 590
(S.D. Ala. 1988) (bone marrow transplantation); McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 565 F Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal 1983) (immune-augmentative therapy). See generally
Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions Under Hospital or Medical Services (Blue Cross-Blue
Shield) Contracts, 81 A.L.R.2d 927, 931-33 (1962).
41 This is the definition used by the American Medical Association's Diagnostic and
Therapeutic Technology Assessment [hereinafter DATTA] program, where "investigational"
appears at the middle of a five-point rating scale, between the "interim" ratings of
"promising" and "doubtful." The DATTA panel decision regarding safety and efficacy is
ultimately based on collapsing the five categories into three, -with ratings of "promising"
weighing in favor of acceptance and ratings of "doubtful" in favor of rejection. "Investigational" ratings, while supporting neither position, have the effect of diminshing the
likelihood of acceptance upon statistical analysis. See, e.g., Alpha-Interferon and Chronic
Myelogenous Leukemia, 264 J. A.M.A. 2137 (H. Cole, ed. 1990).
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These exclusions reflect the complex interactions among the
provider, the patient, and the third party payor. First, treatments

that are undertaken as part of an experimental protocol are often
funded by the scientific or governmental entities sponsoring the
44
research and take place at no cost to the provider or patient.

Second, exclusions of unproven treatments 45help to curb physician

deviation from accepted standards of care.
The third rationale involves the interaction of patient care
reimbursement with the cost of health plan premiums. 46 While there

is no intrinsic reason for new treatments to be more expensive than
established ones, contemporary medical research in areas traditionally resistant to effective intervention often leads to increased costs.
These increased costs usually occur during the early stages of a

new treatment's use in the clinical setting. 47 When incurred by the
insurer, these costs are passed on to the employer-sponsor in the
form of higher premiums. Increases in the cost of health insurance
are a subject of significant concern, especially in light of their

disproportionate contribution to costs in the manufacturing sector. 48 Thus, public policy as well as patient-specific justifications

44 In such cases, requiring insurance reimbursement would have the effect of compensating providers twice for the same procedure.
41 Unproven treatments may thus be excluded on the basis that there is no "medical
necessity" for their provision, as in Washington, 736 F Supp. 1418 (hyperbaric oxygen for
quadriplegia); Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(Laetrile); Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) ("Gerson therapy").
46 This is especially true in complex cases where high benefit costs are incurred.
Savings in general are more difficult to demonstrate, as decreased benefit outlays are
balanced against increased adnmstrative costs, higher costs for covered procedures, and
added benefits in specific areas such as home health care, outpatient services, and rehabilitation. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS & CHANGiN PATIENT CARE? THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 143-62 (B. Gray
& M. Field, eds. 1989).
47 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41 In 1987, spending for health care by business equaled about 6% of total labor
compensation, compared with about 2% in 1965. Levit & Freeland, Health Spending and
Ability to Pay, 10 HETH CARE FiN. REv. I, 1-12 (Spring 1989). Surveys of employer
health insurance premiums have noted increases of 8 to 25 percent for the single year 198788. Gabel, DiCarlo, Fink & de Lissovoy, Employer Sponsored HealthInsurance in America,
in Research Bulletin of the Health Ins. Association of Amenca, (Jan. 1989); Higgins,
HEA TH CARE BENEFIrs SuRvEY OF NEW YORK (1989); Levit, Freeland & Waldo, supra note
24. Meanwhile, insurance underwriters have sustained losses so great as to lead several to
withdraw from the group health insurance market, including Kemper, Provident Mutual,
Allstate, and Transamenca Occidental. Meyer & Page, New Era in Utilization Review, Am.
Med. News, 1, 45 (December 9, 1988).
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may explain exclusions on the basis that procedures are unproven
or investigational.
The difficulties encountered by practicing physicians and third
party payors in evaluating new treatments are complicated by the
contingencies surrounding potential benefits from these treatments. 49 The clinical setting, the patient's age, social circumstances,
and the values placed on short- and long-range outcomes interact
to make such decisions highly individualized and difficult to generalize.50 A test or treatment that is shown to be cost effective only
in a specific patient group is often given to persons outside that
group. 5 1 On the other hand, studies demonstrating substantial benefits for a small group of patients but minimal benefits for others
may lead payors to deny payment for all patients on the5 2grounds
that utilization monitoring would be excessively complex.
Several levels of evaluation can be triggered by a request for
coverage of a new procedure. Explicit policy language may exclude
coverage for specific procedures, leaving the decision whether to
choose such an exclusionary policy within the discretion of the
insurance purchaser.53 A general exclusion of procedures not "in
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice,"
lacking "scientifically proven value," or "experimental or investigational" is commonly found either alone or in conjunction with
specific language excluding certain procedures. Recent insurance
benefits litigation both within and beyond the ERISA context has
led insurers "to search for increasingly precise and understandable
descriptions for contract exclusions . 54and for defensible criteria
for their application to specific cases."1
41 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (1985); Fuchs & Garber,
The New Technology Assessment, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 (1990).
50For example, in the case of a common condition, benign prostatic hypertrophy, the
patient's attitude toward different states of health may determine whether surgery is appropriate. Barry, Mulley, Fowler & Wennberg, Watchful Waiting vs. Immediate Transurethral

Resection for Symptomatic Prostatism: The Importance of Patients' Preferences. 259 J.
A.M.A. 3010-17 (1988).
, An example is the dubious value of computerized tomography scanning in low back
pain. See Wiesel, Tsourmai, Feffer, Citrin & Patronas, The Incidence of Positive CT Scans
in an Asymptomatic Group of Patients, 9 Spnm 549 (1984).
52 This appears to be the rationale governing the payor's decision to refuse funding
for coma arousal programs in McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
" Common exclusions include reasons for service (e.g., diagnostic testing as opposed
to therapeutic treatments); types of service (cosmetic surgery, routine physicals); specific
providers (psychologists, chiropractors, optometrists); lengths or incidents of service (e.g.,
limit of 30 physical therapy sessions per year); and medical appliances or equipment (glasses,
hearing aids).
s'INsTrrTE OF MEDIC wE, supra note 49, at 225. The exclusion language given in
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Beyond the level of policy language, decisions regarding exclu-

sion of certain procedures may be referred on a case-by-case basis
to the medical director of the sponsoring plan, who then consults
55
with an advisory board and computerized technical data bases.

These individuals and resources also engage in a continual process
of evaluation and reformation. New procedures are approved for
coverage, while previously authorized treatment may be elimnnated
from future coverage.5 6 Such decisions are subject to judicial review
with the obvious public policy goals of monitoring uniform treatment of plan subscribers and ensuring that effective treatments are
not excluded from coverage merely to enhance the plan's profitability 57
An innovative method of coping with the lack of insurance
coverage for new medical procedures is the extension of reimbursement for treatments within the context of approved clinical trials.58
Reilly, 846 F.2d 416, 419, reads,
Services and procedures which are experimental/investigative in nature. Experimental/investigative means the use of any treatment, procedure, facility,
equipment, drugs, devices or supplies not yet recognzed as accepted medical
practice by Blue Cross & Blue Shield United -and any of such items requiring
federal or other governmental agency approval and for which approval has
not been granted at the time services were rendered.
In this case, the in vitro fertilization procedure at issue was specifically excluded.
11Technical criteria are listed in Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590-91, as consisting of the
following five questions:
(1) Is the drug or device approved by the Food and Drug Admimstration
("FDA") to market for the particular indication or application in question?
(2) Is there sufficient informationin the peer-reviewed medical and scientific literature to enable Blue Cross to make conclusions about the drug's,
device's, or procedure's safety and efficacy'
(3) Does the available scientific evidence demonstrate a net beneficial
effect on health outcomes?
(4) Is the drug, device or procedure as safe and efficacious as existing
diagnostic or therapeutic alternatives?
(5) Can the drug, device or procedure reasonably be expected to satisfy
criteria 3 and 4 when applied outside the research setting?
For proposed federal criteria, see Medicare Program: Criteria and Procedures for Making
Medical Services Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg.
4302 (1989), which includes lack of FDA approval, explicit research purposes, and inadequate evidence regarding safety and effectiveness as indices of "experimental and investigational" status. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
16Thus, in Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 593, the fact that Blue Cross's evaluation of
HDCT-ABMT had not been updated since 1988 was found to vitiate the defendant plan
administrator's case. Id.
-1 See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy-A Third-PartyPayer's Dilemma, 323
Naw ENO. J. MED. 1702 (1990); Experimental Therapy-Who Shall Pay, 324 Naw ENO. J.
MED. 1291 (1991) (letters to the editor presenting investigators' points of view on the subject
of payment for unproven treatment). See also infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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A specific treatment protocol at a designated institution becomes
not merely a "preferred provider," but the uniquely favored patient care setting. 59 This option has much to recommend it: patients
who might otherwise be unwilling to do so are encouraged to enroll
in randomized trials, thereby facilitating determination of treatment
efficacy; insurance dollars are added to the resources available for
such trials; and patients have greater freedom of choice than in
systems that simply deny coverage for unproven therapy 60 It is
important to note, however, that the nature of such trials dictates
that a significant number of patients are randomly assigned to
groups not receiving the treatment in question. 61 Furthermore, the
insurance company choosing this route would exercise discretion
regarding the choice of trials to be funded. Finally, the insurance
company must possess expertise in study design and be able to
prioritize funding. 62 Recent innovations in the use of clinical trials
will be followed with interest by the growing number of parties to
the debate over coverage of "investigational" treatments.
II.

STANDARD OF

REVw

Until February 1989, judicial review of ERISA fiduciary behavior in benefit denials was limited to an "arbitrary and caprcious" standard. 63 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Bruch,64 the
Supreme Court rejected this standard in favor of de novo review
in the context of pension plan benefit demals.6s When the de novo
standard is applied to health plan benefits, a court abandons
deference to the fiduciary's decision and examnes evidence regard-

,, An example is the Blue Cross and Blue Shield sponsorship of ABMT

climcal trials

at the National Cancer Institute. See Winslow, Blue Cross to Help Payfor Clinical Test of
ControversialBreast Cancer Therapy, Wall St. J., October 30, 1990 at B4; Southwick,
Blues Payfor Clinical Trials of Cancer Therapy, Healthweek, Nov. 5, 1990 at 1.

10Newcomer, supra note 58, at 1703.
61

Id.

6 Payors are placed in a position similar to that of the reviewer of an academic
funding application and understandably would be reluctant to fund less than optimally
designed studies. Id.
63 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1988),
citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983).
-489 U.S. 101 (1989), aff'g Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d

Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Firestone1].
"

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989) [hereinafter

Firestonefl].
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Ing the extent of a procedure's acceptance by the medical com-

munity in order to determine the validity of that decision.6
A.

The "Arbitrary and Capricious" Standard

The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review67 is primarily
an assessment of compliance with the benefit determination pro-

cedure stated in the policy, and is thus readily amenable to judicial
scrutiny. The court's deference to the fiduciary's decision is based

on the rationale that the plan trustees have superior expertise in
the application and interpretation of their plans, as well as the

ability to balance the interests of the plan beneficiaries. 68 Even
when the court might interpret a plan's language differently, the
actions of plan sponsors, insurers, or admimstrators are not contested if they are based on plausible readings.6 9
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is effectively identical
to the abuse of discretion standard, 70 which was applied to ERISA

" See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
67 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (defining the arbitrary and capricious
standard for a decision by a federal agency); see also Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771
F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting the Motor Vehicle standard for an administrator
of an ERISA plan); Dennard v. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982)
(arbitrary and capricious standard under ERISA analyzed according to (1) uniformity of
construction; (2) fair reading and reasonableness of that reading; and (3) unanticipated
costs); Note, JudicialReview of Fiducitary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to
the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CoRNEa L. R. 986 (1986); Comment, The Arbitrary
and CapriciousStandard Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DuQMasNE L. R.
1033 (1985). But see FirestoneII, 489 U.S. at 115 (summary and rejection of the arbitrary
and capncious standard).
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 144 (rejecting the rationale claiming greater expertise on
the part of the trustee as the reason for the deference given to the trustee's determination
and accepting the rationale that the trustee is better able to balance the interests of the plan
beneficiaries); see Comment, supra note 67, at 1049-50 ("The courts have no experience in
admimstering employee benefit plans, and are therefore content to defer to the decision of
the trustees when that decision is supported by the evidence or by rational explanation.").
6Matthews,
Common ERISA Issues Affecting Group Health Care Plans, HEALTH
LAw HAiNaoo 139, 143 (A. Gosfield ed. 1990).
70 Id. at 144. The abuse of discretion standard has been retained m cases where plan
fiduciaries were explicitly given total discretion over benefit determinations. Anderson v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 907 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court de novo
decision in beneficiary's favor because discretion found to have been conferred); Sweeney
v. Gerber Products Co., 728 F Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989) (discretion retained, fiduciary
action upheld); compare Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Ret. Plan, 871 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.
1989) (discretion retained; fiduciary action upheld) with Brown v. Apes-Pittsburg Corp., 11
E.B.C. 1034 (6th Cir. 1989) (no discretion, fiduciary reversed). See also Egert v. Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussion of qualifications
placed on fidicuary discretion and interaction among "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary
and capricious" standards).
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claims by analogy to claims arising under Section 302(c)(5) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).71 LMRA standards
reflect pnnciples of the common law of trusts, 72 which defer to the
discretion of the trustee in allocation decisions unless the decisions
are found to constitute an abuse of discretion. Decisions may be
found to be abusive when "the trustee has an interest conflicting
with that of the beneficiary, ' 73 or when "the trustee's interpretation of a plan is in direct conflict with express language in a
plan." 7 4 Before the FirestoneII decision, the concept that "a court
is not to substitute its judgment ' 75 for that of an ERISA fiduciary
was widely accepted.
B.

The De Novo Standard
The de novo standard differs from the "arbitrary and capri-

cious" standard in two important ways. First, the court does not

defer to fiduciary judgment in a de novo review, seeking instead
to determine the interpretation of the policy language that most
76
accurately represents the intentions of all parties to the agreement.
Second, in making this determination, the court is not limited to
the evidence available to the defendant fiduciary and its representatives, or even to the information that a good faith decision would
have taken into consideration.7 7 The court has the option to examine "all the circumstances and such other evidence
as is
not inadmissible." 7 8 This second distinction has implications that
have not yet been fully realized regarding the introduction of
79
scientific evidence into the judicial context.
7' 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was also
necessary to assert federal junsdiction over LMRA suits, unlike ERISA, which explicitly
authonzed such suits in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(f). See Firestone11, 489 U.S. at 109-10.
- ERISA, as a statute regulating pension as well as welfare plans for employees, is
founded upon the law of trusts. See Firestone1, 828 F.2d at 141. However, courts reviewing
fiduciary investment behavior have applied higher standards. See Note, supra note 67, at
989.
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 141 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
comment g (1959)).
74 Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Comment, supra note 67, at
1047-55. This line of reasoning is applied most logically when the beneficiary's interest in
a trust is a matter of equity, rather than contract, and more specifically, when the beneficiary
has not contributed to the creation or funding of the trust.
7 Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43; accord Reilly, 846 F.2d at 420 ("We may not
undertake a de novo review as to whether we agree with Blue Cross' decision.").
76 FirestoneII, 489 U.S. at 112-13.
Id., citing 3 W FRATCIER, SCOTT ON TRusTs § 201, at 221.
72 Id., citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS, § 4 comment d (1959).
79 See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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FirestoneIIs novel contribution to the standard of review was
its holding that the de novo standard should be used "to evaluate
the propriety of the involved [benefit] system's actual operation
and its content and design, as well as the selection of its admimstrative service providers and the review of its operations." 0 The
Supreme Court held that this standard should be utilized whenever
there is an absence of explicit plan language giving the admmstrator complete discretion over the construction of uncertain terms or
eligibility determinations. 8' Such discretion is not inherent to the
plan 2 and must yield to judicial interpretation of the plan's terms
in light of applicable rules of the law of trusts.8 3
The two rationales behind the "arbitrary and capricious" standard-trustee expertise in the management of pension plans and
the ability to allocate the resources equitably among the
beneficiaries-were examnned and rejected in Firestone L The
argument for superior expertise was invalidated by inquiry into the
type of expertise required, which was found to be legal rather than
adminstrative. 5 Further, "there is a significant danger that the
plan administrator will not be impartial, ' 86 and that his expertise
will be used to the detriment of the plaintiff beneficiaries. The
second rationale also encounters potential conflicts of interest:
determinations in favor of individual beneficiaries will place financial burdens on the insurer and employer, rather than on other
potential beneficiaries in whose favor the trust is intended to op87
erate.
Congress rejected the de novo standard of review under ERISA
in 1982,8 but the reasons for this rejection are obscure and failed
Matthews, supra note 69, at 163.
Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 112; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81 The specific provision of the law of trusts upon which the Court relies states that
"
82

"the extent of the duties and powers of a trustee is determined
by the terms of the
trust as the court may interpret them, and not as they may be interpreted by the trustee
himself or by his attorney." Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 112, citing 3 W FRATCHER, supra
note 77 (emphasis added by the Court).
" See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
" Firestone I, 828 F.2d at 144. This argument is addressed infra notes 92-155 and
accompanying text.
" Id.
7 Id.
at 144-45. While this argument may be valid in the short term for individual
cases, the cumulative effect of increased benefits has had adverse effects upon other
employee beneficiaries.
- See H.R. 6226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in Pension Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 1614 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Labor-ManagementRelations of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1983).
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to convince the Supreme Court of the validity of the "arbitrary
and capncious" standard.8 9 The new standard was announced in
Firestone II as applicable "regardless of whether the plan at issue
is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator

or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of
interest."' 9 The only exception to this rule would be a benefit plan
giving explicit discretion over the matter at issue to administrators

or fiduciaries. In most cases brought subsequently under this standard, such language has not been found, and de novo review has

been applied. 9'
III.

APPLICATIONS OF TE

DE Novo

STANDARD

The standard of review established by Firestone 11 has, as the
appellant corporation and its amici feared, given rise to "more
litigation by employees, participants, and beneficiaries who wish
to assert their right to benefits." 92 The additional weight granted

" Firestone II, 489 U.S. at 114, citing Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837
n.12 (1983) ("failure to act on the proposed bill is not conclusive of Congress' views on
the appropriate standard of review").
1o Further, the attention to questions of impartiality characterizing the Firestone I
decision is explicitly elirmnated in the Supreme Court's ruling. See Firestone II, 489 U.S.
at 115.
91 The l1th Circuit has recently reversed two lower court decisions which applied de
novo review where fiduciary discretion in plan language dictated the narrower standard.
See Anderson, 907 F.2d 1072; Jett, 890 F.2d 1137. When such discretion is found by the
court, an "abuse of discretion" standard is applied according to which review is limited to
the evidence presented to the plan fiduciary, and abuse is found only when factual findings
are "clearly erroneous." See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906
F.2d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1990); Dewitt v. A State Farm Ins. Co. Retirement Plan, 905 F.2d
798, 800-01 (4th Cir. 1990). But see QuesTech Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 713 F
Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Va. 1989); see also Jett, 890 F.2d at 1140-41 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(standard of judicial review where lower court applied de novo standard inappropriately).
In Dewitt, the following language was found to grant such broad discretionary powers as
to make the abuse of discretion standard applicable:
The plan admimstrator shall have the power
to make all determinations
that the plan requires for its admmstration, and to construe and interpret the
plan whenever necessary to carry out its intent and purpose and to facilitate
its admimstration. All such rules, regulations, deterrmnations, constructions,
and interpretations made by the plan administrator shall be binding.
Dewitt, 905 F.2d at 801. In Jones, the effect of similar language was buttressed by the fact
that the reviewing entity included union reprsentatives. Jones, 906 F.2d at 481. It is obvious
that discretionary language is likely to be written into an increasing proportion of plans
and that delegation of fiduciary duties will be closely monitored to ensure compliance with
the allocation of the discretion.
91 Brief for the American Council of Life Insurance et al. as Amtct Curiae, at 10-11,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) [hereinafter FirestoneI].
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plaintiffs' claims under the de novo standard was aptly brought
into play in Aubrey v Aetna Life Insurance Co.,93 where policy
language demonstrated internal contradiction.94 By examining the
entire policy in light of its own "plain and dispositive language"
and placing this language in the context of statutory principles that
the carrier claimed to uphold, 95 the court was able to allocate
benefits in a manner that not only aided the plaintiff beneficiary,
but arguably resulted in "lower long-term cost to the Plan,"9' and
thus to all potential beneficiaries.
A distinction must be drawn between the therapeutic interventions for which argument is made in cases recently decided under
the de novo standard and the claims of "ersatz or self-proclaimed
healers or figures from the fringes of medicine'"' that characterize
many appeals of health benefit demals.9 8 The current discourse in
the federal district courts has been directed toward areas of genuine
controversy. Issue definition is clouded, however, by adnmistrative
problems such as imprecise plan language,9 failure to disclose
current plan exclusions,' ° and ambiguous statements by plan ad-

ministrators.10'
Unlike the de novo review in Aubrey and Firestone, the application of this standard in a suit challenging benefit demal on the
886 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1989).
, In Aubrey, language granting benefits for costs associated with pregnancy, regardless of its diagnosis at the time of employment, conflicted with "pre-existing condition"
language requiring that no diagnosis or treatment of a condition be made within three
months of employment. Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 120-21 (6th Cir.
1989).
, Aetna contended that the apparently exceptional language for pregnancy was included to establish compliance with the Pregnancy Discrimnation Act of 1978, amending
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 741 F Supp. 586, 594-95 (E.D. Va. 1990).
Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (Laetrile
and other forms of nutritional therapy found to be a necessary and required treatment for
lung cancer); Jacob v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 758 P.2d 382 (Or. 1988) ("Gerson therapy"
case decided in plan's favor on both medical necessity and "expenmental or investigational"
grounds).
See Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590 (the terms "experimental" and "investigative"
were not explicitly defined, but could be construed with reference to adjacent language);
DiDomemco v. Employers Co-op. Indus. Trust, 676 F Supp. 903, 907-08 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(liver transplants were excluded from reimbursement in one section of the plan and authorized in another).
NOReilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988); Egert v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990).
10, McKinnon v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 691 F Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ala. 1988); McGee
v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
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grounds that the procedure is experimental or investigational goes
°2
beyond the judicial application of law to a specific set of facts.'
When a court addresses the question whether a specific procedure
is in fact experimental, it must investigate and rule on the validity
of medical opimon. 03 The court is then vulnerable to the influence
of medical experts called to testify on behalf of the validity of
their own procedures of choice. °4 In the highly competitive biomedical research environment, 0 5 significant support may be marshalled for procedures that have not achieved acceptable levels of
efficacy. °6 The intellectually challenging nature of these decisions
is exacerbated by the urgency of judicial determinations when
procedures are presented as being the last possible course of treatment for dying patients.ec The cases that have arisen under the de
novo standard illustrate this problem.
A.

The "Experimental or Investigational" De Novo Cases

Among the many experimental or investigational procedures
subject to de novo review, the most frequently litigated thus far
has been the use of autologous bone marrow transplants for high
dosage chemotherapy ("HDCT-ABMT") in persons with recurrent
cancer.10 8 Other treatments brought into the judicial arena have

""
Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 590 ("[T]he Court must resolve the ambiguity by reference
to the Plan's structure and to the testimony of experts.
").
1*1Zweig & Perry, supra note 12, at 5.

104Id.
101See,

e.g., Healy, Innovators for the 21st Century: Will We Face a Crisis in

Biomedical Research BrainpowerP 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1058-64 (1988); Palca, Hard
Times at NIH, 246 SCIENCE 988-90 (1989).
I See infra notes 112, 124-30, 134-36 and accompanying text.
107See, e.g., Rollo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 90-597 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("When the parties were first before me less than six
weeks ago, I was called upon to decide whether eight year old Tishna Rollo could live or
whether she must die, a humbling and sobenng decision."); Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 587
("Plaintiff pointed out that her condition was one well-documented to progress rapidly and
that only an expedited resolution of this dispute could be effective. Left on this Division's
normal five to six month trial docket, the dispute likely would be overtaken by events and
rendered urelevant."); Dosza v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J.
1989) ("If a preliminary injunction is not granted, ultimate relief for the plaintiff will come
too late
Failure to provide treatment will probably result in death in a matter of
months.").
10 HDCT-ABMT is a procedure by which bone marrow is extracted ["harvested"] from the patient's body, frozen, and stored while the patient receives
large, near lethal doses of chemotherapy. In some cases the chemotherapy is
administered in doses in excess of one thousand times the standard dose. This
high dose chemotherapy kills not only the cancer, but much of the patient's
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included radial keratotomy 109 and "coma arousal" programs." 0
The first case testing HDCT-ABMT against the experimental/
investigational criterion in the federal courts was decided in the
plan administrator's favor, using the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, in June 1988.111 At that time, there was no debate regarding the investigational status of the procedure for recurrent
metastatic breast cancer 112 Thus, the issues were confined to demal
of coverage for bone marrow transplantation following coverage
for precautionary extraction of bone marrow ("harvesting")."'
Authorization for coverage had apparently been granted in a similar case, but that case was clearly distinguished by the plan admimstrator and the court.11 4 The court engaged in something
approaching a de novo analysis despite its stated reliance on the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Specific investigation of the
language associated with the plaintiff's consent to bone marrow
harvesting, which repeatedly emphasized the experimental and contingent nature of this procedure, buttressed the court's finding in
15
favor of the plan admimstrator's denial.

remaimng bone marrow as well. This secondary effect, untreated, could well
be lethal to the patient. Thus, after the chemotherapy is completed, the
patient's stored bone marrow is returned to the patient's body to replace the
damaged bone marrow and thereby "rescue" the patient. A patient undergoing
HDCT-ABMT is hospitalized, often in intensive care, for approximately 10
days of the treatment and requires full-time medical attention.
The entire
procedure costs approximately $100,000. Most health care facilities that provide the treatment require pre-payment, or a substantial deposit.
Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 588; see also Beck, The Politics of Breast Cancer, NEwswEEK,
Dec. 10, 1990, at 62, 65 (discussion of federal funding for cancer research and court battles
for insurance coverage of AMBT treatment); Cowley, In Pursuit of a Terrible Killer,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at 66, 67 (discussion of effectiveness of new breast cancer
treatments).
,09Stnngfield v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 732 F Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
110McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
"' See Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F Supp. 590, 595 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
112Id. at 592. "Agreed Fact No. 5: It is undisputed that autologous bone marrow
transplantation for the treatment of breast cancer is still considered experimental or investigative, even though such treatment is no longer considered experimental by Blue Cross
for certain other types of cancer." Blue Cross is currently funding this treatment for
participants with breast cancer who qualify for a National Cancer Institute study of its
efficacy. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
M Thomas, 688 F Supp. at 593-94. Plaintiff contended that because Blue Cross had
paid for the bone marrow harvesting, it should also cover the transplantation, although the
contingent nature of the harvesting procedure was amply explained and documented.
"" Id. at 595. The precise nature of this claim is not discussed in the opinion, and the
court does not find it to be relevant to plaintiff's argument.
"I Id. at 592-94.

1990-91]

ERISA CoVERAGE REvIEw

One year later, another HDCT-ABMT case advanced the transition from the "arbitrary and capricious" to the de novo standard.
In Dosza v. Crum & ForsterInsurance Co.," 6 the court applied a
de novo standard following Firestone, but noted that "whether the
de novo or abuse of discretion standard was applied, defendants'
determination of noncoverage did not conform with the specific
17
terms of this particular Medical Plan."
Dosza is particularly troubling in light of the court's analysis
of an apparent conflict between the definition of experimental
procedures in the plan as presented to the plaintiff and that applied
by the organization that provided technical consultation to the plan
administrator."' The consultant's policy required that a treatment
be supported by a consensus in peer-reviewed literature, while the
plan language itself merely required that it be "commonly and
customarily recognized throughout the doctor's profession as appropriate in the treatment of the sickness or injury," and "neither
educationalnor experimental in nature nor provided primarily for
research purposes.""' 9 In finding for the plaintiff, the court stated
that ABMT "is commonly and customarily recognized throughout
[the plaintiff's expert witness's] profession, i.e., those administering
ABMT treatment."' 2 Discounting peer-reviewed publications contesting this endorsement, the court in effect decided that the enthusiasm of researchers regarding their area of investigation
amounted to irrefutable evidence of its validity 121
Two reported 1990 cases have subjected HDCT-ABMT to de
novo review in the federal district courts. Pirozzi v Blue CrossBlue Shield of Virginia'2 again examined the procedure for breast
cancer, while Rollo v Blue Cross-Blue Shield of New Jersey'2
116716 F Supp. 131 (D. N.J. 1989). The procedure had been recommended for the

treatment of recurrent multiple myeloma.
Id. at 140.
. Id. at 142.
"-

'

Id. at 134.
Id. at 139. It is noteworthy that six months after the Dosza decision, a federal

distnct court in Nebraska applying the "arbitrary and capncious" standard in the presence
of discretionary language found that HDCT-ABMT was "in an early stage of development"
and definitely witun the boundaries of the "experimental or investigational" exclusion. See

Sweeney v. Gerber Products Co., 728 F Supp. 594, 596 (D. Neb. 1989).
121 Id.
741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
123No. 90-597 (D. N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS,. Genfed library, Dist. file); see also
'"

Cole v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. 738 F Supp. 42 (D. Mass.

1990) (preliminary injunction issued requiring reimbursement for HDCT-ABMT treatment
in case of testicular cancer).
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assessed its value in the treatment of Wilms tumor, a much less
common condition.12 4 Both courts found for the plaintiffs and
rejected Blue Cross's contentions that the procedure lacked proven
value. 12 5 The court reached this conclusion on the basis of extensive
exanunation of evidence presented by the plaintiffs' expert witnesses.' 2 6
The major distinction between these cases arises from the incidence of the condition for winch HDCT-ABMT is proposed. The
availability of research supporting or refuting the plaintiffs' claims
is related to the number of persons suffering from the same type
of cancer as the plaintiffs. This contrast also illustrates the difficulties encountered by insurance carriers when they undertake a
determination regarding the validity of a procedure under unusual
circumstances.
Breast cancer is relatively common, even in the extreme case
exemplified by Mrs. Pirozzi, while Wilms tumor in children is a
rare form of cancer, especially in its relapsed state.127 While the
Pirozzi court had ample evidence both for and against the efficacy
of the treatment,2 the studies relied upon in Rollo were based on
small groups, the largest of winch included only twenty subjects.12 9
The Blue Cross Medical Director in Rollo was thus in the difficult
position of soliciting unpublished reports of small therapeutic groups
(three and four subjects) from specialists in the field whose statements had not been subjected to impartial review 130 In Pirozzi,
significant published evidence could be marshalled to support the
procedure's efficacy in breast cancer, reducing Blue Cross to a line
31
of defense based on the absence of randomized "Phase III" tnals.'
While Phase III evidence is highly supportive of a treatment's
effectiveness, it is, as the Pirozzi court notes, ethically difficult to

I"

See generally Breslow, Epidemiological Features of Wilms' Tumor: Results of the
National Wilms' Tumor Study, 68 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 429 (March 1982). Although
Wilms tumor is the second most common solid tumor in children, its incidence (363 cases
per year in the U.S.) is still extremely low in comparison with the leukemias. The existing
standard of care has resulted in a five-year survival rate of 81%.
"2 Rollo, No. 90-597 (D. N.J. March 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
12 Id. at 22.
127 Id.
In Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 592 nn. 13-14. This evidence, furthermore, included peerreviewed publications as well as testimony of expert witnesses.
I" Rollo, No. 90-597 (LEXIS) (only eight of the twenty children were in complete
remission at the time of the report).
I3 Id. at 20-21. The court criticizes the Blue Cross Medical Director harshly for failing
to give credence to these anecdotal reports.
"I Pirozzi, 741 F Supp. at 594.

1990-91]

ERISA

COVERAGE REVIEW

enroll patients in such studies when they believe that assignment
to placebo treatment might jeopardize the patients' last chance of
survival. 1 2 The court's holding in Mrs. Pirozzi's favor thus suggests

standards of acceptable benefit determination, while the Rollo
holding leaves the carrier under the threat of moral condemnation
for failure to consider scientifically questionable and unpublished
research findings.
A somewhat different application of the de novo standard

appears in McGee v Equicor-EquitableHCA Corp.1 33 In McGee,
payment was demed for treatment received in a "coma arousal
program." 1 34 The patient was a young woman who had suffered a

serious traumatic brain injury This case can be distinguished from
the three previous de novo reviews of experimental or investiga-

tional procedures because the patient's survival was not at issue.
Furthermore, the treatment for which payment was disputed had

already taken place at the time of the decision. Numerous ambiguities cloud the picture: the "coma arousal" program was rms-

takenly (but understandably) assumed to be inappropriate for a
patient not in a state of coma;1 35 the plan's language was self-

contradictory with regard to coverage; 136 and the physician reviewers changed their minds about the value of the requested treat1

ment.

37

Despite these features, McGee presents a clearer example of
the problems inherent in de novo review than the cases involving
HDCT-ABMT The McGee court based its evaluation of the pro-

132Id. Plaintiff's expert witness cited an HDCT-ABMT study that had failed to enroll
patients for over a year. Insurer-funded participation in clinical trials may accelerate the
pace of such enrollments. More innovative approaches to assessment of new medical
interventions include multivariate analysis of nonexperimental data, meta-analysis, decision
analysis, and econormc modeling. Fuchs & Garber, supra note 49, at 673-76.
03 No. 87-1721-K (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
1'3
Id. at 28. Like HDCT-ABMT, coma arousal programs are both expensive and
controversial. According to the expert testimony of Sheldon Berrol, M.D., in McGee, they
are also somewhat misleadingly named, as they are not of proven value for persons in a
persistent vegetative state (the condition recently publicized m the case of Nancy Cruzan),
but are of use for persons at lugher levels of post-traumatic arousal.
" Id. The McGee court criticizes the plan's consulting physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist for failing to make this distinction.
136An exclusion for "long-term physical therapy and rehabilitation services" had
apparently been deleted in a supplementary communication to the plaintiff policyholder;
this finding was contested by the plan administrator. Id. at 7-9.
'"Id.
at 14-25. In summary, the court concludes that the physician's "subsequent
was both unreasonable and came too late." Id. at 40reversal of his previous position
41.
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cedure in question on the testimony of a single, albeit expert,
plaintiff's witness. No publications, peer-reviewed or otherwise,
were cited; no experimental trials were introduced as evidence.' 38
Like the oncologists testifying on the plaintiffs' behalf in the
previous cases, the McGees' expert witness had devoted his considerable energy and intellect to the improvement of coma patients,
and his testimony is not discounted. 13 9 The defendants' failure to
marshal evidence to counter his undocumented assertions is puzzling, yet it does not excuse the court's disproportionate reliance
on his testimony
B. Problems with De Novo Review
Three problems are readily identifiable in the de novo review
process. First, the courts themselves acknowledge that, despite the
increased judicial burden created by this intensive review, decisions
have not differed substantially from those that would have been
made under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 14° Second, the
addition of large and unanticipated areas of coverage by insurance
carriers may call into question their adherence to the standards of
fiduciary responsibility required by ERISA.14 1 Finally, these decisions inject an unacknowledged normative element into the judicial
142
examination of scientific evidence.
In three of the four de novo cases previously discussed, the
court states that the application of an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard would have led to the same result even if the new standard
had been used. 43 Despite exhaustive medical reviews in the three
HDCT-ABMT cases, the courts appear to base their findings on
the abuse of discretion standard when they criticize fiduciaries for

"I See id. at 28. Like many rehabilitation interventions, coma stimulation does not
lend itself to the type of experimental design used for medical and surgical treatments in
acute care.
1,9Dr. Berrol is Director of Medical Rehabilitation at San Francisco General Hospital
and editor of the Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation.

"40See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
,,1 Pirozzi is the only case to date in which the decision was based solely on the results
142

of de novo review. See Rollo, No. 90-597 (LEXIS) ("Assuming that the arbitrary and
capricious standard applied, I have no difficulty in finding that Blue Cross/Blue Shield's
decision falls far short and, as all of the foregoing should indicate, it surely was wrong.");
Dosza, 716 F Supp. at 157; ("The evidence demonstrates quite clearly that whether the de

novo or abuse of discretion standard is applied, defendants' determination of noncoverage
did not conform with the specific terms of this particular medical plan.") (italics added).

1990-91]

ERISA COVERAGE REvmw

inconsistent application of review standards or questionable good
faith in administrative interactions. 144 Likewise, although the McGee
court applies the de novo standard explicitly, its review of the
insurer's behavior and award of attorney fees reflect the criteria
that would be applied under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 145 The sole post-Firestone case to date decided in favor of
the insurance company also reaches a conclusion that would easily
be duplicated under the older standard. 14' Thus, the value of de
novo review may be called into question on the ground that it
requires significant additional judicial time and resources while
failing to alter the ultimate finding.
The tendency of de novo review, as applied thus far, to grant
beneficiaries access to very costly treatments of questionable benefit
may be found to violate the fiduciary duties established by ERISA
§ 404(a)(1). 147 The ERISA fiduciary is under a duty to "discharge
solely in the interest of the participants and benehis duties
ficiaries . so as to minimize the risk of large losses."' 14 When
it grants a single participant disproportionate benefits dubiously
related to plan provisions, the fiduciary risks jeopardizing the fiscal
integrity of the plan as a whole.
Such imprudence has the obvious consequence of placing all
other participants' benefits in peril of loss. This risk is most commonly illustrated in the case of the small employer whose insurance
premiums rise to intolerable levels following the serious illness of
a single employee. 49 Regulatory mechanisms that control insurers'
pricing practices have the effect of spreading the cost of courtauthorized treatment among the entire community of premiumpayers. If the fiduciary is forced by the courts to reimburse health
care providers for questionably effective treatment costing hunI" Were the abuse of discretion standard applicable,

both Prudential and

Crum and Forster have a direct and conflicting interest in the determination
of coverage. Prudential is not merely the impartial, disinterested administrator
of Crum and Forster's Plan, as it purports to be. Its determination apparently

is one which controls payments under its own medical policies.
Dosza, 716 F Supp. at 139.
"4' McGee, No. 87-1721-K (LEXIS).
146 Stringjield, 732 F Supp. 69, 70 (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether

procedure was "experimental"; summary judgment demed).
"I Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988); see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text.
29 U.S.C. §§ i104(a)(1)(A), (C) (1988).
See, e.g., The Crisz in Health Insurance, CONSUMER REPORTS, August 1990, at 533
(examples of small businesspersons whose insurance premiums were raised or whose carrier
refused to renew insurance contracts following illness or injury of employees).
'
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dreds of thousands of dollars, it is, in effect, forced to violate the
standards of prudence established in the explicit language of ERISA.150
The application of the de novo standard of review in cases of
investigational procedures has been cast in terms of scientific assessment, but this characterization of the legal discourse ignores a
strongly value-laden component. In reality, de novo review includes
two prongs: the scientific and the normative. 51 Judicial investigation of the risks and benefits of a given procedure for the patient
leads to a choice between the positions of physician advocates and
remains at least nominally within the scientific forum. However,
once a procedure that falls outside the established scope of covered
health services has been found to be scientifically valid, the decision
that it should be reimbursed for a specific beneficiary is a normative social judgment regarding resource allocation.
While the imposition of judicial values to, override a professional standard of practice is not unknown, 152 It is unusual in case
law It is not inappropriate for the court to interpret plan provisions in light of the values expressed by the contracting parties
within the context of trust law as manifested in ERISA. 5 1 Absent
explicit recognition of the value-laden nature of such a determination, however, the courts may fail to account for the potential
consequences of their holdings in the broader social context. 54 The
results of de novo review thus far, despite expressed reliance on
the interpretation of contractual intent, appear to place the insurer
in the shoes of the physician. The insurer is obligated to do all it
can for the patient's benefit, regardless of the interests of other
55
plan beneficiaries or society as a whole.
110 See

supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.

M For a discussion of this problem in the context of malpractice litigation, see
Hirshfeld, Economic Considerationsin Treatment Decisions, 264 J. A.M.A. 2004 (October
17, 1990).
" See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P 2d 981 (Wash. 1974), reaffirmed, Gates v.
Jensen, 595 P 2d 919 (Wash. 1979).

WsThe terms of trusts are "determined by the provisions of the instrument as interpreted in light of all circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the settlor
with respect to the trust as is not inadmissible." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 4,
comment d (1959).
114 Such consequences include the effect of authorizing extraordinarily costly treatments

on other potential beneficiaries and the plan itself. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying
text.
135See generally W KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 185-93 (5th ed. 1984)
(discussion of standard of conduct in professional malpractice context); Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Current Opimons of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association (1989), Opinions 2.03 and 2.09.
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CONCLUSION

De novo review has given the courts a much broader field from
which to glean medical evidence than was available under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. Beyond the adversarial postures of those testifying for and against the validity of a specific
procedure, the dispassionate expressions of the scientific community should be recogmzed as legitimate elements of the decision
making process. If courts are to be required to make de novo
determinations regarding medical interventions, they must have
access to empirical scientific findings, instead of being limited to
156
the evidence offered by either party to the action.
Searching questions may be directed to the plaintiffs' expert

witnesses: 1) To what extent is their professional advancement
linked with the procedure they advocate? 2) How much of their
compensation is tied to the number of such procedures performed?

3) What evidence argues against their position?1 7 Research specialists also may lack fundamental understanding of the terms of
a health insurance policy as they relate to investigational procedures. 58 The failure of the defendant fiduciaries' counsel to raise
such obvious questions is puzzling. Their relatively passive and
parochial insistence upon adherence to review protocols suggests a
fundamental lack of understanding regarding the scope and potentially determinative nature of de novo review
The growing legitimization of practice guidelines and technology assessment programs argues in favor of their incorporation
into the judicial process.

59

In the past, the lack of timely, reliable

information has led to such anomalous situations as reimbursement

-1 Kinney & Wilder, MedicalStandardSetting in the CurrentMalpracticeEnvironment:
Problemsand Possibilities,22 U.C. DAvis L. R-v. 421, 442-46; Zweig & Perry, supra note
12, at 5; Couch & Rodriguez, Legal Aspects of Clinical Outcome Management, in PHYsiciA
MANAGERS AND TE LAW (J. B. Couch, ed. 1989); Hirshfield, PracticeParametersand the
Malpractice Liability of Physicians, 263 J. A.M.A. 1556.
Ms"When expert judgment proceeds in the absence of direct empirical evidence about
a particular climcal practice, a frequent circumstance, the general scientific reasoning or
normative (ethical, professional) principles supporting the expert judgments should be described." INsTruTE o MEDICInE, supra note 46.
I Such rmsunderstanding is evidenced by the following quote from such an investigator: "I feel very strongly that when there is no good standard treatment, the best treatment
is investigational treatment, and the patient should be covered." Southwick, supra note 59,
at 37.
159Practice guidelines have been under development for several years with varying
success. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 156, at 424-38; INsrruorOF MEDICiNE, supra
note 46, at 103.
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for total hip replacement by most carrners when the procedure was
still classified as experimental by the Food and Drug Adminstration. 106 As a result, governmental and professional groups are
moving rapidly to bridge the information gap between experimental
and clinical practice.
The November 1989 amendments to the Public Health Service
Act' 6' mandate the development and promulgation of "clinically
relevant guidelines that may be used by physicians, educators, and
health care practitioners to assist in determining how diseases,
disorders, and other health conditions can most effectively and
appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, and managed clinically,"' 62 a task to be completed by January 1991. These guidelines
are to "be based on the best available research and professional
judgment regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of health
care services and procedures" and to "include treatment-specific
or condition-specific practice guidelines for clinical treatments.
for use in reviewing quality and appropriateness of medical care."' 63
Medical specialty groups, health insurers, and utilization review
organizations also have been involved with the development of
practice guidelines.' 64 While such guidelines are currently in a state
of rapid evolution, their formulation attests to the ability of clinicians to develop criteria for the dispassionate evaluation of medical evidence in contexts such as the de novo review process.165
As currently applied, de novo review of health benefit denial
because a treatment is of unproven value is vulnerable to scientific
partiality, emotional appeals, and inadequate intellectual grounding. By condoning this pseudoscientific debate, the courts appoint
themselves as arbiters of medical decision-making. Generalization
of de novo review would have profound effects on the efforts of

"6 Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzaick, Evaluation of Medical Technology Strategies, 306
NEw ENG. J. MED. 620, 621 (1982).
161 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West Supp. 1989).
1 Id. at Part B, § 912(a)(1).

163Id.

at Part B, §§ 912(b)(1), (3).

I6 Among these are the American Board of Medical Specialties, the Amencan Medical

Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies, the RAND Corporation, the Health
Insurance Association of America, and the Group Health Association of America. See
INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 23-24.
163 Recognition of these guidelines and programs also has significant implications in

the area of medical malpractice litigation. Recent initiatives in the state of Maine establishing
a 5-year demonstration project on practice guidelines suggest legislative sensitivity to the
potential implications of this problem in a variety of medicolegal areas. See ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2857.3 (Supp. 1990).
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employers, health policy analysts, and legislatures to control the
proportion of national resources devoted to medical care. Cases
arising thus far under de novo review have suggested that the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is adequate in regulating fiduciary procedures and would avoid enmesbing the courts in the
process of scientific investigation. If the de novo standard is retained, however, the courts must have access to the full range of
empincal evidence, rather than being forced to rely upon the
testimony of those experts chosen by the parties in support of their
positions.
The de novo standard of review includes both an attempt at
objective assessment of medical science and a value judgment regarding the resources appropriately expended on a given patient.
The recognition that de novo review is ultimately normative as well
as scientific will encourage the courts to consider the broader social
implications of their decisions.
Julia Field Costich

